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Chapter One: 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Historical Context: 
Nigeria is one of the largest countries in Africa, with a total geographical area of 
923.768 square kilometers and an estimated population of about 140 million (2006 
estimate)1. It lies wholly within the tropics along the Gulf of Guinea on the western 
coast of Africa.  
 
Nigeria has a highly diversified agro ecological condition, which makes possible the 
production of a wide range of agricultural products. Hence, agriculture constitutes one 
of the most important sectors of the economy. The sector is particularly important in 
terms of its employment generation and its contribution to gross domestic product 
(GDP) and export revenue earnings. 
   
Despite Nigeria’s rich agricultural resource endowment, however the agricultural 
sector has been growing at a very low rate. Less than 50% of the country’s cultivable 
agricultural land is under cultivation. The smallholder farmers use rudimentary 
production techniques to cultivate the land but are constrained by many problems 
including those of poor access to modern inputs and credit, poor infrastructure, 
inadequate access to markets, land and environmental degradation, and inadequate 
research and extension services. 
 
Nigeria’s economy is the largest in West Africa, producing 60% of the region’s GDP. 
As the most populated country in Africa, with access to more than 30 million 
consumers residing in neighboring West African countries, Nigeria has a huge market 
for agricultural products and hence attractive to foreign investors2.  
                                                 
1 See CIA: The World Fact book as stated on the website www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni/htm  
2 Nigeria: Agric-food Past, Present and future Report, Canada, March 2006 @ www.ats.agr.gc.ca/stats/nigeria e. 
pdf                                         
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Having adopted a new constitution in 1999, the first truly democratic elections in over 
40 years were held early in 2003. It is the goal of the current government to seek and 
maintain positive relations with western powers, and to promote Nigeria as a leading 
regional and international power.  
 
Nigeria is the only African country to have negotiated both an anti-corruption 
compact with G8 nations, and to have signed on to the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. Nigeria is a member of the WTO, OPEC and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
 
With a new democratic structure in place, and economic reforms poised to diversify 
the economy, Nigeria’s agricultural sector is expected to become modernized and a 
more significant part of the economy. Nigeria is accepting significant investment in 
agriculture to modernize agricultural equipment and practices. Extension services are 
being provided to increase knowledge of better practices and to help expand 
agricultural operations. 
 
It is recognized that agricultural commercialization and investment are the key 
strategies for promoting accelerated modernization, sustainable growth and 
development and, hence, poverty reduction in the sector3. 
 
 However, to attract investment into agriculture, it is imperative that those constraints 
inhibiting the performance of the sector are first identified with a view to unlocking 
them and creating a conducive investment climate in the sector4.  
 
This is important to create appropriate strategies for promoting accelerated 
commercialization and investment in the sector such that, in the final analysis, 
agriculture will become one of the most important growth points in the economy. 
                                                 
3 Jeremiah Dibua; Modernization and Crisis of Development in Africa: The Nigerian Experience, Page 173, 
Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
4 Emmanuel Udogu, 2005, Nigeria in the Twenty-first Century: Strategies for Political Stability and Peaceful Co-
existence, Africa World Press. 
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1.2 The 1st Agricultural Phase5: 
 
Agriculture remains the dominant sector in the rural areas of Nigeria. It provides 
employment for about 60% of the work force. The diversity of climatic conditions, 
the richness of soil types and water sources, and the high population density provide 
great potentials for crop, animal, fish, and tree production. In the 1960s and up to the 
early 1970s, Nigeria’s agriculture flourished. The country was one of the world’s 
highest producers of palm oil, cocoa, and groundnut. Over time, agriculture has 
declined in importance6. 
 
In terms of employment, agriculture is by far the most important sector of Nigeria's 
economy, engaging about 70% of the labor force. Agricultural holdings are generally 
small and scattered; farming is often of the subsistence variety, characterized by 
simple tools and shifting cultivation. These small farms produce about 80% of the 
total food.  
 
About 30.7 million hectares (76 million acres), or 33% of Nigeria's land area, are 
under cultivation. Nigeria's diverse climate, from the tropical areas of the coast to the 
arid zone of the north, make it possible to produce virtually all agricultural products 
that can be grown in the tropical and semitropical areas of the world7.  
 
The economic benefits of large-scale agriculture are recognized, and the government 
favors the formation of cooperative societies and settlements to encourage industrial 
agriculture. Large-scale agriculture, however, is not common. Despite an abundant 
water supply, a favorable climate, and wide areas of arable land, productivity is 
restricted owing to low soil fertility in many areas and inefficient methods of 
cultivation.  
 
                                                 
5 Sokari-George.E; Planning in Nigeria: The agricultural base 1962-1985, Earth and Environmental Science, 
GeoJournal, Volume 14, Number 1/January 1987, Springer Netherlands. This paper critically examines some of 
the causes and the problems of agricultural development in Nigeria. It also discusses very minimally, the rise and 
the contribution of the petroleum industry to the Nigerian economy and its effect on the agricultural sector.  
6 The Transformation of Nigeria: Essay in honour of Toyin Falola and Adebayo Oyebade 2002, Africa World 
Press, Inc, Eritrea. 
7 Akande, S.O; (1999) A study of Agricultural Research System in Nigeria, NISER, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
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However, there are many signs that agriculture is regaining its past glorious 
importance, as agriculture contributed 32% to GDP in 2001. The country is now the 
largest producer of cassava roots and yam tubers; livestock and soybean production is 
among the largest in Africa. The share of agriculture in real GDP has been increasing 
since 1996 and the annual growth of the sector has surpassed population growth in 
recent years. More importantly, the agricultural sector is receiving the expected 
attention from policy makers, which is manifested in several new presidential 
initiatives, e.g., cassava and rice. 
 
In spite of the existence of a well-articulated agricultural policy document for Nigeria 
since 1988, the country has never established a systematic focus in her agricultural 
planning history that shows a conscious effort to purposely prioritize her agricultural 
development based on the generally identified components that constitute modern 
agriculture.  
 
Normally, in terms of concentrating on the development of the various parts of the 
agriculture continuum, the government of Nigeria (GON) should have adopted a 
prioritization scheme in which, for some specified time periods, it would consciously 
emphasize on one or more of the areas of commodity production, commodity 
processing (to add some value), commodity marketing (for either internal 
commercialization or external trade or both), and institutional support services for 
agro industry8.   
 
What has happened instead is that, over the years, there has been the development and 
adoption of programs that tended to generally support only increased production of 
commodities in the country. Such programs have included, among others, the 
following key ones: Farm settlement schemes (FSS) in the early to mid 1950s for 
creating farmsteads of the Israeli Moshav-type agriculture intended to increase 
commodity output and create employment for young school leavers; River basin 
development authorities (RBDAs) for the purpose of harnessing water resources for 
farmers throughout the country; and Agricultural development programs (ADPs) in all 
                                                 
8 S.O Akande, 1999, A study of Agricultural Research system in Nigeria; NISER publication, Oyo State, Nigeria. 
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states of the federation to help organize farmers into more productive agriculture 
through the provision of modern inputs. 
 
These programs/schemes only succeeded in increasing food production but failed in 
the processing and/or commercialization of the food output. Most of the agricultural 
scheme identifies specific areas in assessing current agricultural performance for 
example; the 2001 Rural Development Sector Strategy9. Similarly, the 2002 
Agricultural Policy document that has listed the new directions that agricultural 
development in the country should take has also only listed the various components of 
the agriculture sector without any attempt at prioritizing the components. So, in both 
cases, there is no indication of the desired impact indices that must be attained within 
such periods.  
1.3 Scope and objectives of the study 
 
The primary purpose of this research is to recommend ways in which Nigeria could 
unlock constraints to commercialization and investment in the Nigerian agricultural 
sector for sustained economic growth, enhanced food security, increased 
competitiveness of products in the domestic, regional and international markets; 
sustainable environmental management; and poverty alleviation. The specific 
objectives of this research are, therefore to: 
• Review previous studies on constraints to commercialization and investment in 
Nigeria’s agriculture 
• Identify technical, infrastructural, economic, political, social, policy, and 
institutional constraints to commercialization and investment in Nigeria’s agriculture 
• Explain the persistence and assess the effects of the identified constraints to 
commercialization and investment in Nigeria’s agriculture over time and from regime 
to regime within a political economy framework. 
 
                                                 
9 It identifies the following areas for immediate attention if agriculture and rural development in Nigeria are to 
make the desired impact on the lives of the people:  Institutional restructuring and role reassignment in the 
agricultural extension sub sector; Agricultural technology development and natural resource management; Physical 
and social infrastructural development; Public intervention in specified areas of rural agriculture to measure 
effectiveness; Human capacity building in the agriculture sector. 
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Furthermore this research paper seeks to find the domestic policy options under the 
Agreement on Agriculture that is available for Nigeria to improve her agricultural 
sector. Specific attention will also be given to the legal commitment of Nigeria under 
the WTO, taking into consideration the Agreement on Agriculture to ascertain its 
benefit to developing nations most especially Nigeria.  
 
A paradigm shift from oil to agriculture is expedient as Oil is an exhaustible natural 
resource, which has over the years caused uneven development in Nigeria and the 
shift will go a long way in enhancing the economic situation in Nigeria. It is expedient 
to say that if Nigeria takes advantage of foreign direct investment (FDI) and private 
sector participation in the development of its agricultural sector, by putting in place 
the right policies and making its environment investment friendly, food security, 
wealth generation, poverty elimination, better infrastructure and employment 
opportunities will be guaranteed.  
 
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter one studies the historical context of Nigeria, analyses the 1st Agricultural 
phase before the Oil boom. It reviews Nigeria’s agricultural sector and its potentials in 
the development of Nigeria’s economy, which can thus be commercialized for the 
international market. It further suggests that a paradigm shift from oil to agriculture 
will go a long way in enhancing the economic situation in Nigeria. 
 
Chapter two looks at the agricultural sector in Nigeria from the early 70s where 
agriculture was the country’s was the main revenue earning sector. This chapter also 
examines the Agricultural policies in Nigeria, examining past government policies in 
agriculture, agriculture institutions and policies, the new Nigeria agricultural policy 
direction and the Land Tenure and Agricultural development in Nigeria. 
 
Chapter three examines the emergence and role of the Oil and gas in Nigeria’s 
economy and governance; and its implication on the economy and government, as an 
exhaustible resource.  
 
Chapter four examines the WTO-AOA, Nigeria’s commitment and implementation of 
the AOA. It also examines Nigeria’s trade policy structure looking at the role of 
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regional integration in Nigeria’s development and economic growth. This chapter 
further examines the role of the international community in trade liberalization and 
development process. 
 
Chapter five highlights the Nigeria’s business environment, looking at the enabling 
laws that protect investors and their investments in Nigeria. It also does a comparative 
analysis of other economies of the world that have successfully attracted FDI in the 
development of their agricultural sector. It also ties up with the findings of the 
previous chapters.  
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Chapter 2 
2. THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR 
2.1 Salient Features 
 
Agriculture employs about 70% of the labour force and contributes around 40% to 
GDP, although it makes a minimal contribution to foreign exchange earnings and the 
bulk of Nigeria’s food is imported10. The country, which was a net exporter of 
agricultural produce until the 1970s, currently spends a minimum of $2.5 billion a 
year on food imports, including $600 billion on rice. Other imports are chickens, milk 
and sugar. The principal export crops are cocoa and rubber, which together account 
for nearly 60% of all exports excluding oil. The principal cash crops are cocoa, rubber 
and palm oil, while food crops include sorghum, millet, maize, rice, yams, cassava 
and plantain. Livestock and timber farming and fishing are some of the other forms of 
agriculture practised11.  
 
Agriculture was the country’s main revenue earning sector in the 1970s. About 75% 
(74 million hectares) of Nigeria’s total land (98 million hectares) is arable, although 
only about 40% of this is cultivated.40 Despite the existence of two major rivers, 
which run across large parts of the country (the Niger and Benue), most agriculture is 
rain-fed. Crops contributed some 27% of GDP, livestock another 3.3% and forestry 
and fisheries 1.5%. The agricultural export of significance is cocoa, which contributes 
less than 0.5% to the agricultural GDP12. 
 
Nigeria’s current land tenure system does not encourage long-term investment in 
technology or modern production methods, as there is no freehold title, only 
leasehold13.  
                                                 
10 S.O Akande, 1999, A study of Agricultural Research System in Nigeria, NISER publication, Oyo State, Nigeria. 
11 The Export Crop Sector in Nigeria: UNEP Country Projects-Round 2- A Synthesis report that can be viewed on 
http://www. unep.ch/etu/publications/synth_Nigeria.PDF 
12 Ade Olomolo (1999), Trend and Impact of Government Agric Expenditure in Some States in Nigeria, NISER, 
Ibadan, Oyo State Nigeria. 
13 DON N. IKE (1984) The System of Land Rights in Nigerian Agriculture American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 43 (4), 469–480. Land ownership in the agricultural sector of the Nigerian economy is basically 
communal. Under this system the land holding group is the family, clan, village or community. An important 
practice under communal ownership is the principle of inalienability of land. The mobility of the agricultural labor 
force is inhibited. Non-provincials are forbidden to plant cash crops. Property rights to land are not specific. 
Individualized allotments are absent and land markets non-existent. Other details of the communal system of land 
tenure in Nigeria are given. Reasons are sought for the persistence of custom in the practice of inalienability of 
land even when economic conditions have changed, enabling the right perception of land values. 
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Foreigners are prohibited from owning land. The farming methods are low-yield 
owing to basic levels of farming technology and insufficient supplies of inputs such as 
fertilizer. Rural Nigeria is divided into seven agro-ecological zones14; i.e. semi-arid, 
found only in the northern region; the savannah, found in the northern and middle 
region; a small highland area found in the middle and southern region; a larger 
transition environment of savannah derived from the forest overlapping the southern 
and middle regions; mangroves in the Niger Delta; freshwater swamps in the Niger 
Delta and Lowland rain forest in the south15.  
 
The agro-ecological setting and technology base, in principle, determine the 
production systems. Two major production systems dominate these zones: (i) the 
traditional production system, which is found in all parts of the country and consists 
of land holdings of less than 2 hectares with a variety of food crops intended for 
consumption purposes mainly and (ii) the improved irrigation production system 
which comprises the improved small scale irrigation using low-lying or water logged 
areas for crop and livestock production as well as large-scale mechanized and/or 
commercial irrigation farming systems.  
 
 Many enterprises in Nigeria are linked to the agriculture sector and require little 
capital or skills and rely on informal credit providers. The government has focused on 
the cassava industry to help boost agriculture. It has set up a presidential committee to 
boost cassava production and exports, with a view to raising $5 billion from cassava 
exports in the next few years.  
 
2.2 REVIEW OF THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN NIGERIA AND PAST 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN AGRICULTURE 
Nigeria’ agricultural policy framework has gone through a number of evolutionary 
processes and fundamental changes that has reflected, in a historical perspective, the 
                                                 
14 Solomon, A.O. (1991): Title to land in Nigeria. An inaugural lecture delivered at the Obafemi Awolowo, 
University of Ile-Ife. 
15 Ade Olomola (1999), Trend and Impact of Government Agriculture Expenditure in Some States in Nigeria, 
NISER, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria. 
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changing character of agricultural development problems and the roles which 
different segments of the society were expected to play in tackling these problems16. 
But in the main, the form and direction of agricultural policy were dictated by the 
philosophical stance of government on the content of agricultural development and 
the role of government in the development process17. 
 
In retrospect, four distinct agricultural policy phases18 can be identified in Nigeria the 
first phase spanned the entire colonial period and the first post-independence decade 
from 1960 to about 1969, the second covered the period from about 1970 to about 
1985, the third phase started from about1986 in the structural adjustment period, and 
the fourth was what could be characterized as the post structural adjustment era 
starting from about1994. 
2.2(i) The Pre-1970 Era 
 
In the pre-1970 era, the government philosophy of agricultural development was 
characterized by minimum direct government intervention in agriculture. During this 
era, it was the private sector and particularly the millions of small traditional farmers 
that bore the brunt of agricultural development efforts. Government efforts were 
merely supportive of the activities of these farmers and largely took the form of 
agricultural research, extension, export crop marketing, and pricing activities. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the government created government-owned agricultural 
development corporations and launched farm settlement schemes. But these actions 
found their justification more in welfare considerations than in hard-core economic 
necessities19. 
 
Though towards the end of the 1960s it was clear that the Nigerian agricultural 
economy might be running into stormy weather, as emerging agricultural problems 
included declining export crop production and some mild food shortages arose and 
was ascribed to civil war. 
 
                                                 
16 Manyong, V.M., A. Ikpi, J.K. Olayemi, S.A. Yusuf, B.T. Omonona, V. Okoruwa, and F.S. Idachaba. 2005. 
Agriculture in Nigeria: identifying opportunities for increased commercialization and investment. IITA, Ibadan, 
Nigeria. 159p. 
17. S.O Akande, 1999, A study of Agricultural Research System in Nigeria, NISER publication, Oyo, Nigeria. 
18 Idachaba F.S. 1980; Agricultural Research policy in Nigeria, International Food Policy Research Institute 
19 Idachaba, Supra 
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2.2 (ii) Pre-Structural adjustment periods (1970–1985) 
The turn of the 1970s was characterized by a state of general apprehension about the 
condition of the Nigerian agricultural sector. This led to a fundamental change in the 
philosophy of government towards agricultural development from one of minimum 
government intervention to one of almost maximum intervention, particularly by 
Federal GON. The feeling was pervasive that the solutions to the increasingly serious 
problems of agriculture and especially those of food supply required the heavy clout 
of government in the form of multidimensional agricultural policies, programs, and 
projects, some of them requiring the direct involvement of government in agricultural 
production activities20. The sudden smile of the oil fortune on Nigeria reinforced this 
feeling. Hence, the decade of the l970s and early 1980s witnessed an unprecedented 
deluge of agricultural policies, programs, projects, and institutions. A highlight of 
these is presented as follows. 
2.3 Agricultural sector policies and institutions 
Sector-specific agricultural policies were largely designed to facilitate agricultural 
marketing, reduce agricultural production costs, and enhance agricultural product 
prices as incentives for increased agricultural production21. Major policy instruments 
for this purpose included those targeted to agricultural commodity marketing and 
pricing, input supply and distribution, input price subsidy, land resource use, 
agricultural research, agricultural extension and technology transfer, agricultural 
mechanization, agricultural cooperatives, and agricultural water resource and 
irrigation development. Some of these policies will be discussed: 
2.3(i) Trade policy22 
Policy instruments in this category were those that involved trade liberalization, 
import substitution, the local sourcing of raw material, and tariff structure adjustments 
designed to encourage local production and protect local industries from undue 
international competition and dumping23.  
                                                 
20 Nwosu A.C, 1999 Agricultural Linkages, Structural Adjustment and Macro-Economy of Nigeria, NISER, 
Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria. 
21 S.O Akande, 1999, A study of Agricultural Research System in Nigeria, NISER publication, Ibadan, Oyo State, 
Nigeria. 
22 Oyejide T.A 1986, The Effects of Trade Exchange Rate Policies on Agriculture in Nigeria, IFPRI 
23 Highlights of trade policy instruments were as follows: 
• Trade liberalization measures, the key elements of which were the abolition of commodity marketing boards, the 
abolition of many import levies, the reduction of some excise and export duties, the reduction of the number of 
prohibited import items, and a reduction from 100% to 25% in the advance payment of import duties required at 
the time of opening letters of credit. 
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2.3(ii) Institutional policies 
In pursuance of the objective of giving market forces more influence and the private 
sector a greater role in the economy, most enterprises owned by government and 
parastatals were to be either privatized or commercialized. Hence a National 
Agricultural Insurance Company was established in 1987 to operate and administer 
the Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Scheme. The idea of the scheme was first mooted 
in 1984 as a strategy for tackling the problem of small farmers’ inability to satisfy the 
collateral requirements of banks when asking for loans. The scheme was to issue 
insurance certificate to farmers, which would serve as collateral for loans at 
commercial banks, and funds mobilized from the insurance scheme would be utilized 
for agricultural investment. 
2.3(iii) Fiscal policies 
The objectives of fiscal policies24, which consist mainly of budgetary and tax policies, 
were to enhance fiscal efficiency and reduce inflation through fiscal discipline and a 
reduction of budgetary deficit.  
2.3(iv) Land development policy 
The implementation of land development policy in the country was largely the 
responsibility of a National Agricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA) 
established in 1991. NALDA’s mandate covered the provision of strategic support for 
land development and the promotion of the optimum utilization of the nation’s rural 
land resources. However, NALDA proved to be ineffective and was subsequently 
scrapped25. 
2.3(v) Agricultural commodity marketing and pricing policy 
The major instrument of agricultural commodity marketing and pricing policy was the 
establishment of six national commodity boards in 1977 to replace the regional, multi 
                                                                                                                                            
• Export promotion of non oil goods, including agricultural commodities, by allowing exporters to keep all their 
foreign exchange earnings in a domiciliary account from which they could freely draw for their foreign exchange 
transactions. Furthermore, export financing by commercial banks was facilitated through Central Bank discounting 
facilities. 
• Import substitution measures, which involved the selective use of import regulations to restrict or ban the 
importation of many types of food and industrial raw materials in order to encourage their local production and, 
hence, promote self-sufficiency in domestic food production and the local sourcing of agro industrial raw 
materials. 
24 Monetary circulars issued annually contain information on the government-regulated interest rate structure. 
They are reproduced and discussed in various issue of Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of 
Accounts. 
25 Famoriyo S. 1973b. Land Tenure and Food Production in Nigeria. Land Tenure Centre News 41:10-15 
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commodity boards that had been operating since 1954. It administered a guaranteed 
minimum price policy whereby floor prices were nationally set for each of the six-
grain crops and the board would intervene as a buyer of last resort if and when their 
regular market prices fell below the guaranteed minimum. The board also operated a 
strategic grain reserve scheme26. 
2.4 The new Nigerian agricultural policy Direction27 
According to the document, the new agricultural policy will herald in a new policy 
direction via new policy strategies that will lay the foundation for sustained 
improvement in agricultural productivity and output28.  
2.5 Land Tenure and Agricultural Development in Nigeria. 
Land is perhaps the single most important natural resource in the sense that it affects 
every aspect of a people’s live; their food, clothing, and shelter. It is the base for 
producing raw material for the manufacturing industry.  
 
In 1990, estimates indicated that 82 million hectares out of Nigeria's total land area of 
about 91 million hectares were arable. However, only about 34 million hectares (or 42 
percent of the cultivable area) were being cultivated at the time. Much of this land 
was farmed under bush fallow, a technique whereby an area much larger than that 
under cultivation is left idle for varying periods to allow natural regeneration of soil 
fertility.  
 
Another 18 million hectares were classified as permanent pasture, but much of this 
land had the potential to support crops. Forests and woodlands covered about 20 
million hectares. Most of this land also had agricultural potential. The country's 
remaining 19 million hectares were covered by buildings or roads, or were considered 
                                                 
26 Njoku, P.C. 1998. Nigerian agriculture and the challenges of the 21st Century. Faculty Lecture, Faculty of 
Agriculture, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. 
27 Creating a more conducive macro environment to stimulate greater private sector investment in agriculture; 
rationalizing the roles of the tiers of government and the private sector in their promotional and supportive efforts 
to stimulate agricultural growth; reorganizing the institutional framework for government intervention in the 
agricultural sector to facilitate the smooth and integrated development of the sector; articulating and implementing 
integrated rural development programs to raise the quality of life of the rural people; increasing budgetary 
allocation and other fiscal incentives to agriculture and promoting the necessary developmental, supportive, and 
service-oriented activities to enhance agricultural productivity, production, and market opportunities; rectifying 
import tariff anomalies in respect of agricultural products and promoting the increased use of agricultural 
machinery and inputs through favorable tariff policy. 
28 FMARD (Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development). New Agricultural policy, Abuja, Nigeria 
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wasteland. Nigeria's soil is rated from low to medium in productivity29. However, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) concluded that most 
of the country's soil would have medium to good productivity if this resource were 
managed properly.  
 
Traditional land tenure throughout Nigeria was based on customary laws under which 
land was considered community property30. An individual had usufructuary rights to 
the land he farmed in his lineage or community area. The right of disposal belonged 
only to the community, which, acting through traditional authorities, exercised this 
right in accordance with customary law31.  
 
Various laws and ordinances gave government the power to expropriate statutory 
landholdings in return for compensation. Expansion of the money economy and the 
resulting emphasis on commercial crops encouraged farmers to seek private 
ownership of land. Nonetheless, customary tenure remained the principal form of 
landholding throughout Nigeria as late as the early 1970s.  
 
During the 1970s, however, individuals and business enterprises drove up land prices, 
especially in newly urbanized areas, by investing heavily in real estate. In response to 
a potential crisis in land distribution, the Federal Military Government promulgated 
the Land Use Decree No. 6 of March 1978, establishing a uniform tenure system for 
all of Nigeria. The Act vested all land in each state on the Governor of that state, who 
shall hold such land in trust and administer the land for the use and common benefits 
of all Nigerians. 
 
Subsequently incorporated in the constitution of 1979, (this has been amended by the 
1999 constitution) the decree effectively nationalized all land by requiring certificates 
of occupancy from the government for land held under customary and statutory rights 
                                                 
29 AIAE Policy Brief 1, Unlocking the Potentials of Agriculture and Forest for Growth and Poverty Reduction. 
This Policy Brief is drawn from the study carried out by a research team comprising Prof. Eric C. Eboh, Dr. Kalu 
O. Oji, Dr. Ifeyinwa A. Achike, Oliver C. Ujah, Uzochukwu S. Amakom, Moses O. Oduh, and Chukwuemeka 
C.P. Nzeh of the African Institute for Applied Economics (AIAE), and Bjorn K. Larsen, International Consultant. 
The study was commissioned and funded by the UK Department for International Development, with facilitation 
by Jean-Paul Penrose, Environment Adviser. 
30 Solomon A.O (1991): Title to Land in Nigeria; An Inaugural Lecture delivered at Obafemi Awolowo, 
University of Ile Ife. 
31 Alienation of family Property in Southern Nigeria (196660 P&D) Third National Development Plan 1975-80 
Vol.398. 
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and the payment of rent to the government. The main purpose of the 1978 decree was 
to open land to development by individuals, corporations, institutions, and 
governments. The decree gave state and local governments’ authority to take over and 
assign any undeveloped land. Occupancy or possession of undeveloped land by 
individuals was restricted. To prevent fragmentation, the statutory right of occupancy 
could be passed on only to one person or heir. 
 
The land tenure system in Nigeria before the 1978 Land Use Decree was problematic 
and extant literature has expressed the concern of renowned scholars on the problems 
of traditional land tenure system in Nigeria32. The expression of the scholars with 
respect to the problems of land tenure could be interpreted based on the duplicity of 
ownership of land with consequent excessive transaction costs, fragmentation of land 
into uneconomic sized tracts, and inalienability of land which makes land part of the 
physical capital but not a part of financial capital. 
 
Many government development projects have been shifted by a prohibitive amount of 
compensation demanded by speculative purchasers who had previous knowledge of 
government intentions33. In other instances, disputed claims and counter claims over 
ownership of the proposed site and the attendant law suit coupled with court 
injunction which often prevent the development of land subject to litigation make 
such land unavailable. 
 
It can be said that the objectives of the land use act have remained largely unfulfilled 
29 years after its enactment and title to land appears to be more insecure now than it 
ever was. The implementation of the Act posed almost intractable problems (Fabiyi 
and Adesimi 1979) amongst which is finding a replacement for acquired agricultural 
land is extremely difficult because there is no land in Nigeria without an owner 
(Potential or actual)34 
 
                                                 
32 Famoriyo, A.O, Y.L Fabiyi and A. Gadonu (1977): Problems Posed by Land Tenure in Nigeria Agriculture 
NISER, University of Ibadan 2000pages 
33 Famoriyo, A.O, Y.L Fabiyi and A. Gadonu (1977): Problems Posed by Land Tenure in Nigeria Agriculture 
NISER, University of Ibadan 2000pages. 
34 Making Land Administration Pro Poor: Paper written by Lasun Mykail Olayiwola and Olufemi Adeleye; Land 
Reform – Experience from Nigeria Promoting Land Administration and Good Governance 5th FIG Regional 
Conference Accra, Ghana, March 8-11, 2006 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
 
3. THE ROLE OF THE OIL AND GAS IN NIGERIA’S ECONOMY AND 
GOVERNANCE.  
It would be difficult to exaggerate the role of oil in the Nigerian economy. Since the 
first oil price shock in 1974, oil has annually produced over 90 percent of Nigeria’s 
export income. In 2000 Nigeria received 99.6 percent of its export income from oil, 
making it the world’s most oil-dependent country.  
 
Oil production has also had a profound effect on Nigeria’s domestic sector. One way 
to characterize its impact is by looking at the rents produced by oil – that is, the 
returns in excess of production costs – in the Nigerian economy. From 1970 to 1999, 
oil generated almost $231 billion in rents for the Nigerian economy, in constant 1999 
dollars. Since 1974, these rents have constituted between 21 and 48 percent of GDP. 
Yet remarkably, these rents have failed to raise Nigerian incomes and done little to 
reduce poverty35. 
 
Oil has also had a deep influence on the Nigerian government. Since the early 1970s, 
the Nigerian government has annually received over half of its revenues – sometimes 
as much as 85 percent – directly from the oil sector36. These oil revenues are highly 
volatile – that is, they can fluctuate drastically in size from year to year, causing the 
size of government, and the funding of government programs, to fluctuate 
accordingly.  
 
Few governments are able to cope with this kind of volatility, and it is not surprising – 
in retrospect – that the Nigerian government was unable to adhere to wise fiscal 
policies during the 1970s and 1980s, when oil prices fluctuated sharply. The ability of 
the governments to spend their funds wisely, and limit corruption, has been low.  
                                                 
35 This lack of improvement is striking, given the size of Nigeria’s oil windfall. Had each year’s oil rents been 
invested in a fund that yielded just five percent real interest, at the end of 1999 the fund would be worth $454 
billion. If divided among the general population, every man, woman, and child would receive about $3,750, 
equivalent to about 15 years of wages.  
36 Udeh, John (2002), “Petroleum Revenue Management”: The Nigerian Perspective; Paper presented at the World 
Bank Petroleum Revenue Management Workshop, October 24-25, 2002, Washington D.C. 
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Nigeria’s oil wealth has also led to social and political unrest, particularly in the Niger 
Delta37. If Nigeria’s petroleum were soon depleted, these problems might eventually 
recede into the past. But there is every reason to think that over the next several 
decades, Nigeria’s dependence on petroleum exports will remain exceptionally high; 
it may even grow.  
 
Estimates of Nigeria’s proven oil reserves range from 24 billion to 31.5 billion barrels 
[EIA 2003]; at the current production rate of 2 million barrels a day, these reserves 
alone would last between 32 and 43 years38.
 
Nigeria also has an estimated 124 trillion 
cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves, the ninth largest such reserve in the world; it 
is rapidly increasing its capacity to liquefy and export this gas, which will further 
raise petroleum revenues.  
 
International demand for Nigeria’s energy supplies will almost certainly remain 
strong. World energy demand is projected to rise more than 50 percent over the next 
two decades; demand for natural gas is expected to rise especially fast [CSIS 2000]. 
The high quality of Nigeria’s oil, and Nigeria’s location outside the volatile Persian 
Gulf, suggest that global demand for Nigerian oil and gas will remain high over the 
next several decades. While this is good for the Nigerian petroleum sector, it poses 
major problems for the economy and the government. Nigeria’s oil wealth 
performance will be examined on the five problems that typically link mineral wealth 
to poverty: volatility; the crowding out of manufacturing and agriculture; inequality; 
democracy; and violent conflict.  
 
3.1 Oil Wealth and Human Poverty 
The problems created by abundant mineral wealth are not unique to Nigeria. Mineral 
exporters tend to suffer from a cluster of economic and political ailments [Auty 
2001]39. Recent econometric studies show that states that depend on mineral exports 
tend to have a typically slow economic growth; unusually high corruption rates; 
                                                 
37 Osaghae, Eghosa (1994) "The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority Agitation, and the Future of the Nigerian 
State," African Affairs 94, 325-344. 
38 The government has announced plans to increase production to 4 million barrels a day, and raise reserves to 40 
billion barrels, by 2010. If it achieves these goals – which would entail a large rise in Nigeria’s OPEC quota – oil 
supplies would last until approximately 2036.  
39 Auty, Richard M., ed (2001) Resource Abundance and Economic Development, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
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abnormally low rates of democratization; and sharply higher risks of civil war. Since 
Nigeria is remarkably dependent on oil, it has been highly susceptible to these 
tribulations.  
 
In addition to the ailments above, mineral dependence also tends to aggravate poverty 
[Ross 2003]40. There are five ways that mineral wealth can hurt the poor: by causing 
economic volatility; by crowding out the manufacturing and agriculture sectors; by 
heightening inequality; by inducing violent conflict; and by undermining democracy.  
 
3.2 Economic Volatility  
 
Oil wealth can harm the poor by creating economic volatility. Volatility tends to hurt 
the poor in two ways: by causing macroeconomic shocks, and by making government 
revenues unstable. The volatility of the oil sector also produces volatility in 
government revenues. All oil-rich countries are subject to the same fluctuations in 
international oil prices. But not all governments are equally dependent on oil as a 
source of income. The more that a government relies on oil, the greater the impact 
that oscillations in oil prices will have on the government.  
 
Revenue volatility also shortens the time horizon of all who are influenced by 
government programs41.
 
This tends to be harmful, regardless of how the revenues are 
used. Countries like Indonesia and Malaysia (both major oil exporters), have adopted 
patronage severally in their planning horizon to help the poor, by improving rural 
infrastructure, and providing health and education facilities in low-income areas. In 
both of these countries, the planning horizon of the government has generally been 
long.  
 
Finally, revenue volatility may also hurt the poor by causing instability in government 
policies and institutions. Rich and poor alike are more inclined to invest in their future 
if the government functions they depend on – including policies (such as agricultural 
support programs) and institutions (such as laws and courts) – are seen as stable.  
 
                                                 
40 Ross, Micheal (2003), “How Does Mineral Affect the Poor”, Manuscript. 
41 A shorter time horizon is the same as a higher discount rate. 
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3.3 Crowding Out Manufacturing and Agriculture  
As the Drivers of Change Summary Report suggests, economic growth is “pro-poor” 
when it creates job opportunities for unskilled workers. Oil and gas industries are not 
themselves pro-poor, since they typically employ few unskilled workers. 
Manufacturing and agriculture, by contrast, are more ‘pro-poor’ since they tend to 
produce more low-skill jobs than the petroleum industry [Ravallion and Datt 1996; 
Bourguignon and Morrisson 1998]. This would matter little if growth in the petroleum 
sector had a significant multiplier effect, producing growth in other sectors of the 
economy. The oil boom of the 1970s created difficulties for both agriculture and 
manufacturing by producing an overvalued exchange rate; this, in turn, made Nigerian 
agricultural and manufacturing exports less competitive on international markets42. A 
large petroleum industry can also reduce the number of jobs for the poor by causing 
the Dutch Disease43.  
 
3.4 Undermining Democracy  
Several studies have found that oil wealth tends to make states less democratic [Ross 
2001a; Lam and Wantchekon 1999]. This effect works through three mechanisms. 
First, when a government has abundant oil revenues, it less likely to impose taxes on 
the general population; yet the taxation process typically forces governments to 
become more accountable to their citizens. Conversely, when they are able to keep 
taxes low, governments find it easier to elude the scrutiny of their citizens [Ross 
forthcoming]. Second, governments with abundant oil revenues tend to spend heavily 
on their military forces; by developing a more effective repressive apparatus, they are 
better able to undermine movements that challenge their authority.  
                                                 
42 The government could have provided further benefits to the non-oil export sector, and simultaneously warded 
off inflation, by liberalizing its restrictions on trade. Yet Nigerian elites were politically and ideologically opposed 
to trade liberalization, and the combination of overvalued exchange rates and trade restrictions kept growth in the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors low [Bevan, Collier, and Gunning 1999]. Exports from these sectors were 
further hampered by unfavorable domestic pricing policies, and strong domestic demand [Lukonga 1994].  
43 The Dutch Disease occurs when a booming minerals sector raises both the real exchange rate, and the cost of 
inputs for the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Both of these effects will raise the price – and hence reduce 
the international competitiveness – of exports from the manufacturing and agricultural sectors.  This relies on the 
growing body literature on the “Dutch Disease” phenomenon, which takes its name from the effects of a boom in 
natural gas on the economy of the Netherlands. Contributions to the literature include A.C Harberger, Dutch 
Disease; How much Sickness, how much Boom?” Resources and Energy 5 (No.1.1983), and H.Siebert, ed, The 
Resource Sector in an Open Economy (Berlin: Springer. Verlag, 1984) 
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Finally, democracy typically evolves from societies undergoing industrialization. Oil 
development generally does not lead to industrialization44. This tends to weaken 
democracy, which in turn harms the interests of the poor.  
 
3.5 Sparking Violent Conflict  
Oil dependence tends to increase the danger of civil war, which poses special dangers 
for the poor. These insurrections have four common elements. First, before the 
resource was exploited, people in these regions had a distinct ethnic or religious 
identity that set them apart from the majority population. Second, they share a belief 
that the central government was unfairly appropriating the wealth that belonged to 
them, and that they would be richer if they were a separate state. Third, in most cases 
local people bore many of the costs of the extraction process itself – due to land 
expropriation, environmental damage, and the immigration of labor from other parts 
of the country. They commonly argue that they have not been sufficiently 
compensated for these costs.  
 
Oil has also played a major role in the recent Delta conflicts45. The Delta region 
contains the key ingredients for an oil-based conflict: it is the source of most of the 
country’s oil; the region is populated by minority groups that have borne a 
disproportionate share of the costs of oil extraction, and believe they have received 
inadequate compensation; and the geographical spread of oil platforms, pumping 
stations, pipelines, and other infrastructure gives local groups ample opportunity to 
express their dissatisfaction by blocking the extraction process46.  
 
 
 
                                                 
44It infact retards industrialization by causing the Dutch Disease. This relies on the growing body literature on the 
“Dutch Disease” phenomenon, which takes its name from the effects of a boom in natural gas on the economy of 
the Netherlands. Contributions to the literature include A.C Harberger, Dutch Disease; How much Sickness, how 
much Boom?” Resources and Energy 5 (No.1.1983), and H.Siebert, ed, The Resource Sector in an Open Economy 
(Berlin: Springer. Verlag, 1984) 
45 The Igbo effort to secede from Nigeria, which led to the 1967-70 civil war, was deeply rooted in ethnic tensions 
and Nigeria’s colonial past; but the rebellion was encouraged by the presence of oil, and hence the belief that 
independence would be economically beneficial for the Igbo people. Similarly, the unrest among the Ogoni and 
Ijaw peoples in the Niger Delta can in part be traced to their desire to win a larger share of the region’s economic 
wealth.  
46 Osaghae Eghosa (1994) The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority Agitation, and the future of the Nigerian 
State, “African Affairs 94, 325-344. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4. NIGERIA AND THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE. 
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) marks a significant policy departure in 
modern economic history. It sets out a programme for progressive liberalisation of 
trade in agriculture. The Uruguay Round (UR) saw agricultural protectionism as a 
factor for trade distortions and included agriculture in the agenda for negotiation. The 
participants of the UR focused accordingly on the need to bring “more discipline and 
predictability to world agricultural trade”47. In fact, agriculture was never excluded in 
the old GATT.  
 
However, GATT-1947 rules applying to agricultural trade were weaker than those 
that applied to manufactured goods. The reason for this was that many nations 
regarded agriculture as a sector of economic activity that should be accorded special 
status48. Former discipline on Agriculture, allowed, for instance, quantitative 
restrictions and export subsidies. Dispute settlement required consensus.  
 
Trade in agriculture has always been a politically sensitive issue. This may be seen in 
the number of disputes over agricultural trade. Although the share of agriculture in 
world trade sank from one half to one-tenth over the 40 years from 1948, agricultural 
trade continued to account for about half of all disputes brought to GATT. The 
implications for trade in agricultural goods are enormous. Today, not only are rules 
concerning trade in goods generally applicable to trade in agricultural goods, but new 
rules specific to trade in such products are set out in the WTOA's Agreement on 
Agriculture.  
 
The WTOA promises to limit national agricultural policies which impede 
international trade in agricultural products. The new WTOA rules should increase 
efficiency of and decrease friction arising in trade in agricultural products. These 
developments represent truly positive economic and political outcomes. 
                                                 
47 Croome, John (1995), Reshaping the World Trading System: A history of the Uruguary Round, WTO, Geneva 
110-111. 
48 Bernard Hoekman and Micheal Kostecki (1995), The Political Economy of World Trading System: From GATT 
to WTO, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 200. 
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The Agreement on Agriculture requires WTO Member countries to undertake a 
number of measures towards liberalising agricultural trade. There are three major 
areas of commitment, namely market access, domestic support and export 
competition49.  
 
Key elements of the market access commitments are ‘tariffication’ (calculating tariff 
equivalents of non-tariff import barriers and adding those to fixed tariffs), tariff 
reduction, and binding of tariffs. During the negotiations, it was realized that 
tariffication alone would not lead to better market access opportunities. Many 
countries at that time were imposing quantitative restrictions to limit the volume of 
import of particular commodity groups. These were included in each country’s tariff 
rate quotas (TRQs), which would allow low tariff imports up to a certain amount. The 
total number of TRQs was 1,366 in 36 countries.  
 
The emphasis of the domestic support provisions is on limiting the effects of trade-
distorting measures. Domestic subsidies may distort trade; however, not all subsidies 
do so. Therefore, the Agreement divides subsidies into three groups namely the Green 
box, the blue box and the Amber box.  
 
The Agreement establishes a ceiling on the total domestic support, commonly referred 
to as ‘Aggregate Measurement of Support’ (AMS)50. The green and blue box 
subsidies are exempt from inclusion in AMS. Export subsidies are considered trade 
distorting. The Agreement bans their use unless they qualify under some exceptions. 
Many developing countries can hardly pay export subsidies. This is affordable only 
by the developed countries. In fact, only 25 of the current WTO Members have 
agricultural export subsidy entitlements in their schedules, which cover a total of 428 
product groups. 
 
                                                 
49 This has spawned a wide range of literature on the potential impact of the Agreement on the prices of food 
imports; and on the agricultural production. See, for example, Greenfield, de Nigris and Konandreas (1996); 
Hamilton and Whalley (1995); Konandreas and Greenfield (1996); Lindland (1997); and UNCTAD (1995a, 
1995b; and FAO (1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 1999, 2003a, 2003b). 
50 Hoekman, B., F. Ng, and M. Olareaga (2002). ‘Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus Domestic Support: What’s 
More Important for Developing Countries?’ WB Policy Research Working Paper No. 2918. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
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The Agreement has also de minimis provisions, which exempt from reduction 
supports that are less than 5% (10% for developing countries) of production value. 
The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, closely linked to the 
Agreement on Agriculture, allows countries to restrict trade in order to protect human, 
animal, or plant life. However, this should not be a disguised restriction on trade. 
4.1 Nigeria's Commitments and Implementation of AoA 
 
Nigeria undertook bindings for agricultural products at the rate of 150% and a 
maximum 80% for other duties and charges (ODC)51. The bound rates for most 
products are considerably higher than applied custom duties. These bindings provide 
the country with substantial degree of freedom without necessarily violating the 
country's obligations in WTO.  
 
Nigeria was not committed to reduction in domestic support, neither was the country 
committed to reduction in export subsidies52, import protection and export incentives. 
Nevertheless supports and incentives to the sector are being reform mainly for ease of 
administration. The country's obligation in these areas is the filing of notifications on 
support programmes and on export prohibitions and restriction on food products and 
even these notifications have not proceeded smoothly53.  
 
Although the country is not committed to reduction in tariff rates, liberalization of the 
agriculture sector has continued. Market access conditions have improved 
tremendously over the pre-UR period. Implementation of AoA has brought some 
changes: tariff liberalizations and the removal of non-tariff barriers in the agricultural 
sector. Applied tariffs on agricultural products decreased from an average of 30.5% in 
1990 to about 23% in 1998.  
 
                                                 
51It is noted that custom duties on 333 six-digit HS tariff lines were also bound at between 40 and 80% 
52 There is no export subsidy in place in Nigeria. However, there are a host of export incentives that are applied on 
non-discriminatory basis. Thus, there are no incentives (or subsidies) directed at agricultural exports. The 
operations of these schemes have been declining over the years due to lack of funds and bureaucratic procedure. A 
repackaged incentive was introduced in August 1999. The need to minimise government expenditures on some of 
these schemes and the desire to comply with WTO regulation on the use of non-cash incentives to support export 
activities prompted the review.  
53 E. Olawale Ogunkola (2005), "Advancing Nigeria's Agricultural Development through the Doha Development 
Round (DDR), in E. Olawale Ogunkola and Abiodun Bankole (eds). 
 
 
 
 
2674951 
 
 24
Nigeria maintains some import prohibition measures for the purpose of safeguarding 
domestic producers54. Importation of some agricultural products (millet, sorghum, and 
wheat flour) and gypsum were banned for safeguard reasons. Other trade control 
measures applicable to agriculture are prohibitions, sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
inspection and certification.  
 
Agricultural products featured prominently on the list of export prohibitions. These 
products include raw hides and skins, and wet-blue leather; maize; yam tubers; palm 
kernels; beans; rice; timber and unprocessed wood, except gmelina logs; scrap metal; 
and unprocessed rubber. A mandatory phyto-sanitary requirement for the exports of 
fresh plants and plant products is required. Similarly, a mandatory certificate of origin 
and a declaration of value for exports of cocoa are required. Export of animals and 
related products require sanitary certificate (WTO, 1998). 
 
Nigeria's agricultural resources are under-utilised mainly due to under-utilization of 
resources; low productivity as a result of technological and investment constraints; 
and infrastructural constraints. About a third of the potential agricultural resources are 
currently under cultivation.55 Since the technology of agricultural production is still 
backward, the fortune of the sector depends to a large extent on favourable weather 
conditions (timely and well distributed rainfall) and various activities of government 
agencies directed at minimising some of the constraints to agricultural development in 
the country. 
 
In summary, the country made very little commitments in AoA; hence the required 
implementation has been limited to notification of changes in existing policy 
environment. Evidence point to lack of capacity (lack of resources and lack of 
understanding of the issues involve) rather than deliberate policy as the main 
determinant of the country's commitments. Indeed lack of capacity to implement the 
agreement has also featured in the notifications56. This point is informed by the 
                                                 
54 Nigeria’s system of industrial incentives is analyzed by T.A Oyejide, Tariff policy and Industrialization in 
Nigeria, (Ibadan, Ibadan University Press 1975); and T.J Bertrand and J. W Robertson; An Analysis of Industrial 
Incentives and Location in Nigeria (Washington, D.C, WB 1978). 
55According to WTO (1998), area currently under cultivation was about 34 million hectares. This translates to 
about 37% of total arable landmass. 
56 Ogunkola E.O (2001) Nigeria and the New Round on Agriculture: Issues and Policy Options; Department of 
Economics, National University of Lesotho. 
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development in the policy environment since AoA came into effect and the role 
assigned to the agricultural sector in the development of the country. 
4.2 NIGERIA’S TRADE POLICY STRUCTURES 
 
The main thrust of Nigeria’s trade policy is the integration of the economy into the 
global market system57. This entails progressive liberalization to enhance 
competitiveness of domestic industries; effective participation in trade negotiations to 
harness the benefits of the multilateral trading milieu; promotion of transfer, 
acquisition and adoption of appropriate technologies; and support for regional 
integration and co-operation. Within the broad framework of macroeconomic policy, 
trade policy formulation cuts across a broad spectrum of stakeholders.  
 
Following the reinstatement of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, Nigeria's economic 
policy-making processes, including trade policy, are now formalized through the 
institutional law-making process58. 
 
Nigeria's current trade policy clearly acknowledges the role of international trade in 
the nation's economy and therefore makes a strong reference to vibrant engagement in 
bilateral, regional and multilateral trade negotiations, as a way of boosting trade and 
achieving full integration into the global economy. Thus, the government of Nigeria 
has at every opportune occasion reiterated its continued commitment to the principles 
and objectives of the multilateral trading system (WTO 2005: 19).  
 
Under NEEDS59, the policy vision is to drastically reduce uncertainty and 
unpredictability in the trade policy regime harmonize trade practices with ECOWAS 
                                                 
57 See Consortium for study of Nigerian Rural Development Strategies and Recommendations. 
58 Agbaje, Adigun and Afeikena Jerome, (2005). Institutional Framework and Process for Policy Making in Africa: 
The Case of Nigeria, in Ogunkola, O E. and Bankole, A. (eds) Nigeria's Imperatives in the New World Trade 
Order, Africa Economic Research Consortium (Nairobi, Kenya) and the Trade Policy Research and Training 
Programme (Ibadan, Nigeria). 
59 NEEDS is Nigeria’s home- grown poverty reduction strategy (PRSP). NEEDS builds on the earlier two-year 
effort to produce the interim PRSP (I-PRSP), and the wide consultative and participatory processes associated with 
it. NEEDS is not just a plan on paper, it is a plan on the ground and founded on a clear vision, sound values, and 
enduring principles. It is a medium term strategy (2003- 07) but which derives from the country’s long-term goals 
of poverty reduction, wealth creation, employment generation and value re-orientation. NEEDS is a nationally 
coordinated framework of action in close collaboration with the State and Local governments (with their State 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, SEEDS) and other stakeholders to consolidate on the 
achievements of the last four years (1999- 2003) and build a solid foundation for the attainment of Nigeria’s long-
term vision of becoming the largest and strongest African economy and a key player in the world economy. 
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countries, respect Nigeria's obligations under multilateral and regional trading 
systems, and create a conducive and competitive environment for Nigerian businesses 
to flourish and compete in the regional and global economies. The goal of policy here 
is to lay a solid foundation for fully exploiting Nigeria's potential in international 
trade and in helping it become the gateway to West and Central Africa.  
 
The principal strategies and instruments for achieving this goal under NEEDS include 
harmonized tariffs with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) 
and other countries and adopting the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET); it 
also entails co-operation with other African and developing countries to ensure that 
the WTO trade negotiations take into account the concerns and interests of Nigeria 
and Africa (NEEDS: 83).  
 
Indeed, given the phenomenal pace of globalization, with the multilateral trading 
system acting as a major catalyst, it has become imperative that trade policy critically 
recognize the role of the WTO and the need to actively participate in the process so as 
to take advantage of the benefits it offers60.  
 
This is equally true of Nigeria's participation in such schemes as the New Economic 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), ECOWAS Trade Liberalization 
Scheme (TLS), the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); and the ACP-EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)61.  
 
Nigeria became a founding member of WTO with the coming into effect of the 
Marrakech Agreement, establishing the Organization, in January 1995. However, 
Nigeria's involvement in the multilateral trading system dates back to 1960, when the 
                                                 
60 Briggs. Inye (2007) Nigeria: Mainstreaming Trade Policy into National Development Strategies; Africa Trade 
Policy Centre. ATPC is a project of the Economic Commission for Africa with financial support of the Canada 
Fund for Africa.  
61 The ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, which was signed in Cotonou in June 2000 (Cotonou Agreement), 
provides for the conclusion between the ACP and the EU of “new World Trade Organisation (WTO) compatible 
trading arrangements, removing progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing cooperation in all 
areas relevant to trade” (Article 36(1)). Pursuant to Article 37(5) of the Cotonou Agreement, negotiations of EPAs 
will be undertaken with ACP countries which consider themselves in a position to do so, at the level they consider 
appropriate and in accordance with the procedures agreed by the ACP Group, taking into account regional 
integration process within the ACP. The Cotonou Agreement establishes a comprehensive framework for ACP-EU 
relations. At the centre of the partnership are economic development, the reduction and eventual eradication of 
poverty, and the smooth and gradual integration of ACP States into the world economy.  
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country formally joined the then General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
after gaining independence from colonial rule.  
 
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations however, 
GATT was succeeded by WTO, the key objective of which is continuous 
liberalization of global trade through the harmonization of global trade rules, aimed at 
greater reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers.  
 
WTO is guided by such principles as nondiscrimination, amplified under such 
concepts as the most-favoured-nation (MFN) status and national treatment, 
transparency, coherence and predictability; and increased tariffication or tariff 
bindings. All of these, taken together, guarantee the achievement of WTO's overall 
goals and objectives of a secure, stable, predictable rules-based multilateral trading 
system.  
 
Nigeria's commitment to these principles and objectives of the multilateral trading 
system, in itself implies that Nigeria is bound by the obligations she has undertaken 
under the WTO Agreements. It can therefore be easily inferred that the multilateral 
trading system must have impacted significantly on Nigeria's trade policy, given the 
WTO's role of harmonizing global trade rules.  
 
WTO obligations enjoin its members to commit to implementing the specific 
requirements contained in the Agreements, which therefore confer at once privileges, 
benefits and obligations. This therefore poses various challenges, mainly to 
developing countries, especially given the Principle of "Single Undertaking"62.  
 
A positive side of membership of the WTO, asides extending the immediate benefits 
of market access through lower tariffs and the MFN principle, is that the organization 
also assists members in undertaking trade policy reforms. Although for developing 
countries, such reforms can be very painful and costly, it is often considered that in 
                                                 
62 Single undertaking means that virtually every item of the negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible package 
and cannot be agreed separately. “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. 
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the medium to long term, such reform agenda would enable affected countries to reap 
the benefits, as they would be able to engage more effectively in global trade.  
 
Thus, as recommended by McLinden (cited by Newfarmer 2006:23), "high-income 
countries should make disciplines flexible enough to accommodate countries that 
have low capacity to implement accords, and developing countries should view the 
WTO negotiations as an opportunity to advance their domestic reform agenda". 
 
Turning now to Nigeria's level of implementation of its WTO obligations, it is 
noteworthy that a cardinal objective of a rules-based multilateral trading system, is the 
streamlining of trade policy through tariff bindings, and this ensures that levels of 
tariff reductions already attained are not reversed.  
 
Under this specific obligation, the government, both in the trade policy roadmap and 
the NEEDS document, acknowledges that trade policy had lacked consistency, 
certainty and predictability. Thus, the current policy posture subscribes to the need for 
certainty and predictability of the tariff regime.  
 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, only one 
item (stockfish) was bound in Nigeria's tariffs (WTO 1998:39). Under current WTO 
obligations, Nigeria has bound all her agricultural tariff lines at the ceiling rate of 150 
percent, although applied MFN rates are somewhat lower.  
 
The wide margin between the level of agricultural bound rates (though in consonance 
with the requirement of binding all agricultural products) and applied rates, and the 
high level of unbound industrial tariffs, makes Nigeria's tariff profile highly opaque. 
Further, the government's decision to retain high tariffs and the continuous imposition 
of import bans makes trade policy highly uncertain and unpredictable.  
 
It nonetheless has to be measured against the WTO tenet of a consistent, transparent, 
certain and predictable policy. There thus appears to be a policy disconnection and 
contradiction; on the one hand, the government states as a policy objective, the 
attainment of policy coherence, certainty and predictability and yet, on the other hand, 
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affirms the retention of prohibitions, exemptions, exceptions and high tariffs, for 
purposes of protection of domestic industries. 
 
It is noteworthy; however, that the government has taken some bold reform measures, 
aimed in part at complying with WTO obligations as part of specific trade policy 
measures and also as part of overall macroeconomic institutional reform, to boost 
capacity: These measures include: 
• The abolition of general import licenses; 
• The abolition of state trading enterprises otherwise known as Commodity Boards; 
• No-local-content requirements legislation in line with the TRIMS Agreement, even 
though local content inputs are encouraged through the provision of certain incentives 
on a non-discriminatory basis; 
• Reform of the customs administration and customs procedures, leading to the 
modernization of practices, through computerization of procedures to improve 
efficiency, transparency and accountability. It is known as the Automated System 
Customs Data (ASYCUDA).  
 
4.3 ROLE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION ON TRADE POLICY 
At the regional level, Nigeria subscribes to the view that regional integration can 
serve as a building block to attaining economic growth and development. Indeed, 
regional integration schemes can play a very useful role in reform and further 
liberalization of policy. In this regard, the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme 
and attendant Common External Tariff (CET)63 are noteworthy.  
 
The ECOWAS CET as agreed to by members would consist of four bands: 0 per cent; 
5 per cent; 10 per cent; and 20 per cent, similar to those already being applied by the 
UEMOA member-States. Although Nigeria has missed deadlines in the past, it has 
remained committed to implementation of the CET.  
 
                                                 
63 The advantages of the Common External Tariff in integration schemes are well known. They are first and 
foremost a measure of the degree of integration among contracting parties. An obvious advantage of the CET is 
that adopting it is a way of reducing asymmetry in the distribution of gains and losses. The CET thus helps lessen 
potential tensions between members by lowering external tariffs, which helps to generate the classical gains from 
trade. 
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In line with this commitment, Nigeria commenced implementation of the first stages 
of the CET on 1st October 2005. By applying the CET, Nigeria will reduce the 
number of tariff bands from the 19 bands hitherto operated to the four that are 
operational under the ECOWAS regime. This implies that about 65 per cent of 
Nigeria's total imports (capital goods, raw materials and essential goods, such as 
medicines, will be subject to duties of 0 per cent – 10 per cent. Indeed, before the 
reform, 83 per cent of Nigeria's tariff lines were higher than UEMOA rates. Thus, 
Nigeria's average tariff rate has declined by more than 50 per cent following 
harmonization with the UEMOA rates. (Briggs 2005) 
 
4.4 ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
According to Agbaje and Afeikhena (2005: 350), there are challenges of capacity 
constraints that negatively affect the capacity of Nigeria to participate effectively in 
the WTO negotiations or even in the multilateral trading system in general64. 
However, the Uruguay Round, which ushered in the WTO, has brought along 
unprecedented obligations not only in relation to reducing tariff barriers but also 
towards the implementation of far-reaching reforms. Such reforms affect both trade 
procedures and many areas of regulation, which lay the basis for basic business 
environments in the domestic economy, for example, Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, and TRIPS. (Finger and Schuler 
2002:493).  
 
In realization of the challenges brought about by this development, especially on 
demands for trade liberalization and the subsequent impact and implications for 
development, WTO embodies perhaps the most far-reaching impact of the 
international community on Nigeria's trade liberalization since the advent of the 
                                                 
64 In assessing the challenges of capacity constraints currently facing Nigeria, Oyejide (2000); Butegwa (2004); 
Bankole (2005); and Agbaje and Afeikhena (2005: 351) have summarized some of the critical features namely: 
• Limited knowledge base: the absence of in-depth knowledge and understanding of the rules, and technical issues; 
Limited research, analysis and evaluation capacities; 
• Lack of access to up-to-date information on global developments and their potential impacts, including policy 
formulation by trading partners; 
• Lack of attention to strategic and tactical planning, especially on a long-term basis, and non-anticipation of 
possible future developments, with the result that pre-emptive positions or appropriate policy alternatives are not 
formulated. 
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SAPs. Additionally, the WTO also has a key objective of providing technical 
assistance, mainly focused on training and dissemination of information65.  
 
There are other multilateral agencies66 involved that has assisted Nigeria with the 
enhancement of the trade policy process. Thus, apart from the Commonwealth study, 
aimed at improving export quality of agricultural produce as well as meeting WTO 
obligations, other assistance programmes that have been geared to the human capacity 
area, have not been well co-ordinated or effectively streamlined67.  
 
The EU68 is a very important trading partner for the ACP countries today (EU-
ACP69), particularly in agriculture. Agriculture is an important source of foreign 
currency for most ACP countries, and the majority of their population depends on that 
sector for employment and livelihood security.  
 
In addition, most ACP countries have comparative advantage in agriculture, and they 
often rely heavily on exports on a handful of agricultural products for their economic 
development. At the same time, it is in agriculture that the EU applies its highest and 
most complex tariffs, often in combination with non-tariff barriers (particularly rules 
of origin and various standards). This limits the chances of many developing countries 
                                                 
65 In this regard, Nigeria has participated in several workshops and seminars aimed at capacity building, especially 
in the understanding of the WTO Agreements. 
66 Apart from the WTO, other multilateral agencies like the World Bank and the World Customs Organization, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), UNCTAD, the Commonwealth and other bilateral donors like 
the DFID and USAID, has on occasion assisted with enhancement of the trade policy process, either through 
targeted human capacity-building programmes or institution building, to improve administrative or regulatory 
frameworks. In relation to trade policy, USAID was active in supporting the Nigerian Trade policy review 
exercise, which was adopted in 2002. The outcome of that process, which stands as the current trade policy road 
map, provided the basic frame for mainstreaming trade into the NEEDS. DFID has also provided assistance, which 
led to the inclusion of trade into National Development Strategies in August 2004. The role of trade as a 
development strategy was also reassessed. The exercise eventually produced what came to be known as the "Trade 
Policy Action Plan". 
67 In this regard, Agbaje and Afeikhena (2005: 353) after doing an assessment of a list of technical assistance 
programmes in which Nigeria has benefited from the WTO and other agencies, conclude that they fail to 
sufficiently take into consideration the institutional inadequacies and structural deficiencies that prevent optimal 
deployment of financial assistance to support activities that could use these results in a more profitable and 
creative manner. 
68 The Cotonou Agreement does not fulfil the WTO rules on free trade agreements, since the EU is the only part 
that has to do any tariff reductions. Under WTO rules, both parties to a free trade agreement must reduce tariffs on 
“substantially all trade”. 
69 The EU-ACP trade is currently governed by the unilateral and non-WTO-compatible Cotonou Agreement. This 
agreement grants the ACP countries trade preferences for exports to the EU. EC-ACP Economic Partnership 
Agreements and WTO Compatibility: An Experiment in North-South Inter-Regional Agreements?", 43(5) 
Common Market Law Review (2006) 
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to trade and develop. However, the developing countries70 comprised by the Cotonou 
Agreement get an advantage over competing developing countries from the 
preferential market access the agreement provides71. 
 
The issue of agriculture becomes even more important in the current EPA 
negotiations for three main reasons: firstly, the Lomé agreements as well as Cotonou 
already provide duty free access to the EU market for virtually all industrial products 
originating from the ACP countries and, from the perspective of ACP countries, the 
current negotiations are largely about securing additional market access for their 
agricultural products. 
 
Secondly, even if the EPA negotiations result in the reduction or elimination of all 
tariffs on ACP agricultural exports, the probability of many ACP countries 
successfully exploiting any such opportunity is rather minimal due largely to poor 
supply capacity on their part and high sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards 
applying in the EU.  
 
Finally, given that the commodity protocols – particularly those on beef/veal and 
sugar – still play a crucial role in the economies of many of the beneficiary ACP 
countries, any moves towards reciprocal EPAs is likely to adversely affect the 
interests of those countries72.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 Melaku, Geboye Desta: Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: WTO Compatibility and Negotiations 
on Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
States", May 2006, published by the FAO Legal Office at http://www.fao.org/legal/prs-ol/lpo56.pdf  
71 In other words, for most ACP countries preferential access to the EU market is a great advantage. This access 
may also be improved, since the EPA negotiations will build on and reinforce the market access rules in the 
Cotonou Agreement (Council of the European Union, 2002). In addition, the preferences would be unlimited in 
time, and more legally certain, since the EPAs are to be WTO consistent. 
72 Melaku, Geboye Desta: Legal Issues in International Agricultural Trade: WTO Compatibility and Negotiations 
on Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
States", May 2006, published by the FAO Legal Office at http://www.fao.org/legal/prs-ol/lpo56.pdf  
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To improve the market access73 by, inter alia, addressing export subsidies and 
domestic support, for all agricultural products originating from ECOWAS, while 
preserving existing preferential arrangements74. 
EPA has been described as an impediment to Nigeria’s development strategy. This is 
clearly shown in the result of the EPA Impact Assessment study on Nigeria, which 
has implicated the EPA of making Nigeria loose about $478million by end of 2008 
(after being signed for implementation by the end of 2007), while the EU gains about 
$709million during the same interval/period, one is only left with a wonder on how 
EPA would bring the needed poverty reduction and development to Nigerians as 
expressed by NEEDS. 
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) monitors the national trade policies of 
the WTO's members regularly under the General Council. TPRM75 is to ensure the 
transparency and understanding of trade policies and practices, improve the quality of 
public and intergovernmental debate on the issues at stake. Via TPRM, multilateral 
assessment of the effects of policies on the world trading system is enabled and 
members’ countries are encouraged to follow closely the WTO rules and disciplines, 
and the commitment undertaken. 
 
The reviews undertaken by the TPRB are established at the same level as the General 
Council, on the basis of two documents: a policy statement by the government under 
review, and a detailed report prepared independently by the WTO secretariat.  
                                                 
73 As noted, the benefits of ACP agricultural exporters in many of these areas are being eroded for various reasons, 
including reduction and/or elimination of EU MFN tariffs at the multilateral level, and reform of EU domestic 
support schemes particularly in products subject to commodity protocols in the Cotonou Agreement. 
Consequently, to the extent the EPA negotiations go outside their primary focus on dismantling ACP trade barriers 
to EU products, improved ACP agricultural market access will be the priority. Indeed, that is precisely what they 
mean when the ACPs propose for the extension of the EBA initiative to all ACP countries under the EPAs. 
Moreover, even assuming that the EU will agree to duty-free access for ACP agricultural products under EPAs, the 
most difficult obstacle to ACP agricultural exports comes from the high EU health and safety standards in place 
particularly in the agricultural sector. 
74 Under Article 36(4) of the Cotonou Agreement, the ACP and the EU “reaffirm the importance of the commodity 
protocols, attached to Annex V of this Agreement. They agree on the need to review them in the context of the 
new trading arrangements, in particular as regards their compatibility with WTO rules, with a view to safeguarding 
the benefits derived there from, bearing in mind the special legal status of the Sugar Protocol.” Also we call for the 
abandon of all types of subsidies at the end of a period of three year, as from the conclusion of the current round of 
negotiations. 
75 The four largest trading members; the EU, the United States, Japan and Canada, are examined every two years. 
The next 16 countries in terms of their share of world trade are reviewed every four years; and the remaining 
countries every six years, with the possibility of a longer interim period for developing countries. 
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These two reports, together with the proceeding of the TPRB are published after the 
review meeting76.  It is also important to note that the Agreement on Agriculture 
involves annual reporting to the Committee on Agriculture, with details of any 
changes in the use and levels of tariffs, NTBs, export subsidies and domestic support 
arrangements, including updated AMS calculations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 The TPRB will also carry out an annual overview of the developments in the international trading environment 
which are having an impact on the multilateral trading system, assisted by an annual report by the Director-
General setting out major activities of the WTO and highlighting significant policy issues affecting the trading 
system.  
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CHAPTER FIVE. 
 
5. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NIGERIAN BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT. 
 
Attracting foreign direct investment is at the top of the agenda for most countries. 
There is still much debate about which factors and policies most influence the 
location decision in the global marketplace: rule of law, corruption, legal and 
regulatory stability, market size, taxes, infrastructure service, to name a few. 
Transparency, protection and non-discrimination are investment policy that underpins 
efforts to create a sound investment environment. 
 
Nigeria is a nation undergoing tremendous change and reform on both the political 
and the economic fronts. With its enormous human and material resources, and with 
its long-established and significant influence across the African continent, Nigeria 
stands on the brink of more substantial and more sustainable economic growth in the 
years ahead.  
  
Nigeria is desirous of developing its agricultural, industrial and services sectors. The 
private sector, though previously held back by an over-powerful public sector, is at 
last beginning to play a leading role. The financial sector and the stock market are 
already geared to facilitate and assist participation and partnership. 
 
All business enterprise in Nigeria must be registered77 with the Registrar-General of 
the Corporate Affairs Commission. A foreign investor wishing to set up business 
operation in Nigeria needs to obtain local incorporation of the Nigerian Branch or 
subsidiary as a separate entity for that purpose. There are several other laws governing 
investment protection in Nigeria78.  
 
                                                 
77 The Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 (CAMA) is the principal law regulating the incorporation of any 
business in Nigeria. 
78 However, the principal laws are the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Decree No.16 of 1995 and the 
Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No.17 of 1995. The NIPC Decree No.16 of 
1995 establishes the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC). The NIPC issues guidelines and 
procedures, which specifies priority areas of investment and prescribe incentives and benefits which are in 
conformity with government policies. 
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In agriculture, as in the rest of the economy, Nigeria is currently undergoing a marked 
shift in the relationship between the state and the economy. Previously, the role has 
been that which is typical in a command economy, where all activity has been 
controlled and carried out directly by the government.  
 
In shifting away from this model of development, it has become necessary to redefine 
the role of the government as it relinquishes its hold on activities, which it used to 
dominate and direct. Most obvious of these is the need for the government to rebuild 
and expand the necessary infrastructure.  
 
The government must also promote and maintain a stable policy environment 
conducive to development and growth. Management of such policy tools as the 
exchange rate are key as is the protection of the basic institutional requirements of a 
market economy: a well functioning legal framework, stable financial system, clear 
rules of the game, and the power and will to enforce these.  
 
It is important to note that the private sector will play an important role in other parts 
of the food and agricultural system as well. Most important will be the marketing and 
distribution of both inputs and outputs, areas where the private sector was active 
before 1975 but where the government has been dominant since. 
 
An Agricultural Credit Guarantee scheme was set up in the 1970s, under which the 
federal government and the Central Bank of Nigeria guaranteed up to 75 percent of 
loans lent for agricultural purposes. And specifically to encourage foreign investment, 
foreign firms were allowed to hold up to 60 percent of the shares in agricultural 
ventures, as against 40 percent in most other sectors under "indigenization" 
regulations.  
 
Despite these incentives, most foreign firms remained uninterested79. Foreign 
companies were apparently holding out for additional concessions from the 
government, particularly over repatriating profits and remitting salaries. 
                                                 
79 According to Central Bank of Nigeria figures, foreign private investment in agriculture, forestry and fishing 
remained at approximately the same level of $130 million a year between 1979 and 1981, but the share put into 
agriculture of total foreign investment actually fell back between 1978 and 1981 from just over 4 percent to just 
over 3 percent. 
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Commercial and merchant banks have been directed to commit more of their loan 
portfolios to agriculture. Interest rates have been increased to encourage lending, but 
grace periods for borrowers have been lengthened, with tree crop farmers and 
ranchers benefiting most.  
 
Along with such measures the scope of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme is 
being expanded. Fiscal incentives include a three-year income tax holiday for new 
agribusiness and the exemption of agriculture machinery and equipment from import 
duty. Inducements for foreign companies are even greater.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture is to set up an Agricultural Investment Bureau to give 
investors advice and guidance, and the government has repeatedly hinted at increasing 
the amount foreign companies can hold in agricultural ventures, but it seems to be 
moving away from such a move.  
 
Economic analysts are skeptical that these incentives will encourage the kind of 
investment capital Nigeria needs to revitalize its economy. "Frankly the past three 
governments have tried in one form or another to stress foreign agricultural 
investment," said Jay Fetner of the African Development Group, but they only "add 
inconsequential things." Fetner says that what's keeping investors out of Nigeria is the 
country's exchange controls which limit the percentage of profits a foreign company 
can repatriate. "Nigeria is a huge virgin market-the profit margins are tremendous, 
you don't have to export, you can make all your money locally-the problem is 
repatriation of profits," says Fetner. "It's easy to make a buck in Nigeria; it's just hard 
as hell to get it out of the country." 
 
The Nigerian government says that short-term cash problems make limits on the 
repatriation of profits a must, as this is believed to be in the country’s interest. The 
government's recent attempts to encourage investment, however, are prompting some 
foreign firms and Nigerian entrepreneurs to look more closely at the profitability of 
agribusiness. 
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5.1 Policies to Attract Foreign Direct Investment 
 
There is keen competition among developed and developing countries to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI). This drive to lure investment often extends to the 
subnational level, with different regional authorities pursuing their own strategies and 
assembling their own baskets of incentives to attract new investments.  
 
Various reforms and strategies have been implemented, with mixed results. Some are 
critical of the high costs of many of these initiatives, arguing that it would be more 
rewarding to improve a country’s general business environment.  
 
The Nigerian government is not left out in its keen competition to encourage private 
sector and foreign investment in her agribusiness and has come up with some 
incentives to attract FDI and their effectiveness80. 
 
Despite these incentives, there are however bottlenecks, both endogenous and 
exogenous, that have hampered FDI inflows into the developing countries, including 
Nigeria. Topmost among the endogenous factors are political stability and an enabling 
environment. Political instability and civil strife scare away investors, both domestic 
and foreign. Without an enabling environment, private initiative and economic 
enterprise will be limited and will deter FDI. 
 
Economic geography, size and locational factors have a major bearing on foreign 
investment. This in itself is a plus to Nigeria, because of her population81. There is a 
host of other contributory factors, many of which are inextricably linked with, and 
                                                 
80 This incentives include the removal of import duties on raw materials for the manufacture of livestock feeds; the 
supply of fertilizers to farmers in substantial quantities with a 75 percent subsidy; the establishment of subsidized 
tractor-hiring services throughout the country; all capital expenditures on plant and equipment incurred in 
agricultural production by individuals or companies will, apart from attracting existing capital allowances, enjoy 
an additional investment allowance of 10 percent; where losses are suffered by a company engaged in agriculture, 
such losses can now be carried forward indefinitely until they can be written off against future profits; where loans 
are granted to aid investment in agriculture, the interests payable on such loans will not enjoy special exemption 
from taxation; those who lease out agricultural equipment will not be given capital allowances for tax purposes. 
81 However resource endowments are not a prerequisite for attracting FDI as the case of both Mauritius and the 
Dominican Republic demonstrates. Examples from other countries like Hong Kong and Singapore provide ample 
proof that countries with no natural resources can still attract considerable flows of FDI. And outdo better-
endowed countries. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some resource-rich country officials are wary of FDI because 
their country is going to be exploited by foreigners 
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indeed define, underdevelopment. These include the low level of domestic income of 
most developing countries including Nigeria, dilapidated economic and social 
infrastructure, poor work ethics, the shortage of trained labour, the relative lack of a 
business culture, undeveloped financial and capital markets, and the absence of a 
business- and investor-friendly environment.  
 
Study from the ACP states shows that the Caribbean and Pacific countries which have 
not known major conflicts have been more successful in attracting FDI than the 
African countries, some of which like Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, have been through periods of civil wars. Periods 
of unrest not only discourage FDI in the country concerned, they also cause damage 
to social and economic infrastructure and delay much-needed economic reforms 
which are often prerequisites for FDI. 
 
There have however been success stories of countries that have been able to attract 
foreign investment to their economies. Mali and Mozambique are good examples and 
the questions that will arise, is what have these two countries done right? First, it 
appears that these two countries have established a stable macroeconomic 
environment, at least by investors. The Governments approved important pieces of 
legislation, including new Mining (1991) and Investment (1995) Codes in Mali and a 
new Industrial Free Zone regime in Mozambique (1994). Moreover, the adoption of 
international treaties related to FDI helped to increase the Governments’ visibility in 
the international business community as well as provided additional insurance to 
potential foreign investors82.  
 
To improve the climate for FDI, an econometric analysis indicates that strong 
economic growth and aggressive trade liberalization can be used to fuel the interest of 
                                                 
82 As an illustration of this multiplier effect, it suffices to look at the investment projects financed by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) – the private arm of the World Bank Group in Mozambique and Mali over 
the past few years. Those investments range from projects in banking to printing and tourism, for a total 
commitment of $65 million and $134 million in Mali and Mozambique, respectively, as of June 1998. 
Interestingly, the IFC’s portfolio in Mozambique was the largest in Africa, while that in Mali ranked in sixth 
position, greater than that in Nigeria, Cameroon or Ghana. It is believed that the IFC’s portfolio allocation 
illustrates well the interest of the international private community in these two countries and the progress that they 
have achieved in their business climate. 
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foreign investors83. Beyond macroeconomic and political stability, those countries 
focused on a few strategic actions such as: opening the economy through a trade 
liberalization reform; launching an attractive privatization programme; modernizing 
mining and investment codes; adopting international agreements related to FDI; 
developing a few priority projects that have a multiplier effects on other investment 
projects; and mounting an image building effort with the participation of high political 
figures, including the President. 
 
Interestingly, these actions do not differ significantly from those that have been 
identified behind the success of other small countries with limited natural resources 
such as Ireland and Singapore about twenty years ago. In developing its agricultural 
sector, Indonesia which is oil rich like Nigeria and Angola followed a policy of 
emphasis on agricultural infrastructure and technological improvement with modern 
high yielding varieties, as part of an overall economic policy program which resulted 
in high non-oil growth rates over sustained periods. Price policies encouraged 
fertilizer use, supplied from domestic production using petrochemical feedstocks. 
Indonesia also avoided extreme exchange rate overvaluation, though there were 
periods in which it appeared to be overvalued to some extent. Agriculture received a 
large share of public investment, more than 20 per cent in the initial years of the oil 
boom. An important aspect of government policy was its long run nature. 
 
Successful sector development has been a matter of decades with an early and 
sustained emphasis on an agricultural investment program. An added benefit is the 
beneficial effect on income distribution, since the majority of the poorest in Indonesia 
(as in Angola and Nigeria) were rural. Indonesia's emphasis was on its staple crop, 
such as rice, which in particular has potential for large yield increases using existing 
technologies. 
 
The impressive growth performance of the agricultural sector contributed 
substantially to the achievement of Indonesia’s development objectives: food security, 
low and stable prices, generation of employment and foreign earnings/savings. 
                                                 
83 Similarly, a closer look at the experience of Mali and Mozambique – two countries that have shown a 
spectacular improvement in their business climate during the 1990 reveals that the implementation of a few visible 
actions is essential in the strategy of attracting FDI. 
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Indonesia is an excellent example of Mellor’s theories (1966) regarding the role of 
agriculture in economic development. Agricultural development in Indonesia is 
arguably a significant determinant of growth in other sectors of the economy. During 
three decades of palpable economic progress, the agriculture sector, which is 
expanded mostly by smallholder activity, propelled the Indonesian economy through 
forward and backward linkages and through demand creation (Uphoff, 1999). 
Daryanto and Morison (1992) found that the consumption linkage effect of the 
induced growth in the agricultural sector represents a more potent intersectoral 
influence than the production linkages of agricultural growth. 
 
Expansion of agriculture is seen as one of the main ways to overcome the crisis. There 
are five features of agriculture that make it an attractive option (Sunderlin 1998, 
Daryanto 1998a, Daryanto 1998b). First, provision of adequate basic need 
commodities (which include agricultural products) is a strategic priority of the 
government in order to preserve the conditions of stable rule and legitimacy. Second, 
the low proportion of imported inputs in the agriculture sector means agriculture has 
not been as badly affected as other sectors by the crisis. Mounting food imports and 
foreign exchange constraints have increasingly turned attention towards the need to 
expand food production. Third, the agricultural sector functions as a ‘social safety 
valve’, by absorbing some of the retrenched labour, as well as new entrants to the 
labour force unable to find work in urban areas. Fourth, the agriculture sector can 
make useful contributions to foreign exchange either by raising a country’s earning 
from exports or by producing agricultural import substitutes. Fifth, the agricultural 
sector is an important potential source of demand for other sectors. A growing 
agricultural sector will stimulate the demand for industrial products. With increasing 
incomes in the agricultural sector, the effective demand for domestic manufactured 
goods would be bolstered. 
 
It is important to note that both foreign and local investors want to ensure that they get 
a reasonable return on their investments. They will only invest if the business 
environment is secure and predictable enough to allow them to reap the benefits over 
time.  
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Tax and investment incentives cannot on their own outweigh political risks and risks 
of capital expropriation. The availability of a cheap, literate and easily trainable 
labour force is an important consideration during the initial stage of industrial 
development when manufacturing operations are likely to be concentrated at the low 
end of the market. An industrial culture and good work ethics are a distinct advantage. 
After the initial learning period is over and the wage level starts to go up, labour 
intensity gradually gives way to skill-intensity and it is the quality and level of skills 
that will attract further FDI flows into higher-value added products. Simultaneously, 
the industrial structure undergoes a gradual transformation from the low end to the 
middle end of the market.  
 
Infrastructure facilities like telecommunication, regular power and water supplies, 
reliable air and sea connections, developed banking facilities, well-located industrial 
sites and efficient internal transport facilities are important prerequisites. These must 
not only be available but they must also be competitive in price and quality or they 
can more than offset the labour cost advantage that may have been the driving force 
behind the FDI decision in the first place.  
 
The regulatory framework in any country wishing to attract FDI must be modern and 
transparent.84 Laws must be enforceable and there must be no discrimination against 
foreigners. Another important aspect is very basic and concerns the level of safety 
prevailing in a host country. If a country is perceived to be a safe place, this inspires 
confidence in the eyes of the foreign investor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 Like in Mauritius, Mali, and Mozambique amongst others. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION. 
The result of this study shows that transparency, property protection and non-
discrimination are investment policy principles that underpin efforts to create a sound 
investment environment for all. Investment promotion and facilitation measures, 
including incentives, can be effective instruments to attract investment provided they 
aim to correct for market failures and are developed in a way that can leverage the 
strong points of a country’s investment environment. Policies relating to trade in 
goods and services can support more and better quality investment by expanding 
opportunities to reap scale economies and by facilitating integration into global 
supply chains, boosting productivity and rates of return on investment. Competition 
policy favours innovation and contributes to conditions conducive to new investment. 
Sound tax policy enables governments to achieve public policy objectives while also 
supporting a favorable investment environment.  
 
The degree to which corporations observe basic principles of sound corporate 
governance is a determinant of investment decisions, influencing the confidence of 
investors, the cost of capital, the overall functioning of financial markets and 
ultimately the development of more sustainable sources of financing.  
 
Public policies promoting recognized concepts and principles for responsible business 
conduct, such as those recommended in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises help attract investments that contribute to sustainable development. Such 
policies include: providing an enabling environment which clearly defines respective 
roles of government and business; promoting dialogue on norms for business conduct; 
supporting private initiatives for responsible business conduct; and participating in 
international co-operation in support of responsible business conduct.  
 
Human resource development is a prerequisite needed to identify and to seize 
investment opportunities, yet many countries under-invest in human resource 
development due in part to a range of market failures. Policies that develop and 
maintain a skilled, adaptable and healthy population, and ensure the full and 
productive deployment of human resources, thus support a favourable investment 
environment.  
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Sound infrastructure development policies ensure scarce resources are channeled to 
the most promising projects and address bottlenecks limiting private investment. 
Effective financial sector policies facilitate enterprises and entrepreneurs to realise 
their investment ideas within a stable environment. 
 
Regulatory quality and public sector integrity are two dimensions of public 
governance that critically matter for the confidence and decisions of all investors and 
for reaping the development benefits of investment.  
 
While Nigeria has gone a long way in reducing trade barriers, development of the 
agricultural sector is constrained by non-trade factors especially agricultural 
production infrastructure. The need to develop these facilities for any reform to have 
optimum impact on the sector should be accorded priority. Further liberalisation of 
the sector without addressing the infrastructural bottleneck is capable of aggravating 
the problem of agricultural trade in the country, at least from the experience of the 
previous liberalisation.  
 
The characteristics of Nigerian farmers require that peasant farmers be protected and 
that efforts should be geared towards encouraging large-scale farming in order to 
optimally benefit from trade liberalisation of the sector. Development of the necessary 
infrastructure and effective land reform will not only encourage large-scale farming 
but also ensure that the benefits of reform get to the main actors, the farmers.  
 
Further reforms in the agricultural sector in Nigeria should proceed at least at the 
same level with reforms in the developed countries or at best the developed countries 
should lead. The country should take advantage of the next round not only to seek 
better latitude for the use of various supports, but also to demand for reform of AoA 
and effective implementation by the developed countries. The next round should also 
be an avenue for the country to bind its agricultural products at floor level and 
possibly liberalised the non-strategic sub-sector.   
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Nigeria in developing its agricultural sector may take a cue from countries like 
Indonesia that emphasized on agricultural infrastructure and technological 
improvement with modern high yielding varieties, as part of an overall economic 
policy program which resulted in high non-oil growth rates over sustained periods.  
 
Price policies encouraged fertilizer use, supplied from domestic production using 
petrochemical feedstocks. Indonesia also avoided extreme exchange rate 
overvaluation, though there were periods in which it appeared to be overvalued to 
some extent. Agriculture received a large share of public investment, more than 20 
per cent in the initial years of the oil boom. An important aspect of government policy 
was its long run nature. Nigeria should think of a functional agricultural investment 
program that will develop the sector. Nigeria should also concentrate on its staple 
crop, which in particular has potential for large yield increases using existing 
technologies.  
 
The study further shows that the agricultural sector functions as a ‘social safety 
valve’, by absorbing some of the retrenched labour, as well as new entrants to the 
labour force unable to find work in urban areas. Research also show that the 
agriculture sector can make useful contributions to foreign exchange either by raising 
a country’s earning from exports or by producing agricultural import substitutes. The 
drastic currency depreciation provides increased opportunities for expanding 
traditional crops (such as cocoa, cassava, palm oil production).  
 
The agricultural sector is an important potential source of demand for other sectors. A 
growing agricultural sector will stimulate the demand for industrial products. With 
increasing incomes in the agricultural sector, the effective demand for domestic 
manufactured goods would be bolstered. 
 
Finally, it is clear that FDI can play a constructive role in this process by transferring 
capital, skills and know-how. However, not only is attracting FDI not the same thing 
as development, but it seems clear from the findings in this report that whether it 
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contributes to development depends on macroeconomic and structural conditions in 
the host economy85.  
 
Designing appropriate growth-oriented strategies requires much greater policy space 
for Nigeria, including more strategic trade and industrial policies adapted to their 
specific economic and social conditions and development challenges. The danger to 
be avoided in designing FDI policies is a tendency to confuse the means of global 
integration with the ends of economic and social development.  
 
A more development conscious framework must be mindful of all the possible 
channels whereby FDI can impact, both positively and negatively, on domestic 
economic performance, including through the balance of payments, local financial 
markets, and market structure; it must provide the means to manage the procyclical 
and herd-type tendencies of investors; and it must, above all, be situated in relation to 
the fundamental processes of capital accumulation, structural change and 
technological upgrading which are the ultimate drivers of catch-up growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 FDI seems to have reinforced a pattern of adjustment that privileges external integration at the expense of 
internal integration, typified by the establishment of enclave economies. Behind this trend lies a policy philosophy 
that wrongly contrasts the efficiency of foreign firms with the distortionary economic impact of the local state. 
This dichotomy is no longer helpful to thinking about the challenges facing most African countries, including with 
respect to FDI. This call was echoed in the Zedillo Report on Financing for Development, and more recently both 
the Blair Commission Report on Africa and the Sachs report on the MDGs have arrived at a similar conclusion. 
Combined with a debt write-off, this should provide African countries with the necessary “big push” to break out 
of the vicious circle of low growth and rising poverty. 
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